Trapped cash

Commentary

After Turkey and Egypt, this session discussed Argentina: have the shock devaluation and the rise in interest rates had the desired effect of making the currency more convertible, and starting the economy on the – slow and painful – road to recovery?

As in the other two cases, the response was one of guarded optimism. Business appears to be holding up, and the flow of currency out of the country has been improving. Also, as in the other cases, the exchange rate has stabilised. This does not mean there are no issues and everything is plain sailing: the Argentine consumer is going through a very difficult period. But one – Argentinian – participant said the pain is being accepted, at least for the time being. Inflation has started to come down: to put it in perspective, in September 2024, it had come down to an annualised rate of 209%, against 237% in August (source: BBVA). The central bank’s goal is 18%, and participants are budgeting for something between 30% and 50% next year,

Of course, this is Argentina, so nothing is simple:

• Foreign currency remittances have improved – for current imports, i.e, ones since December 2023.
• Many imports from before 2023 still cannot be settled. Various options exist:
  • BOPREAL bonds: these are three series of US dollar denominated bonds issued by the Argentine government, which will mature in October 2027 (series 1), June 2025 (series 2) and May 2026 (series 3). At maturity, the dollars can be remitted to settle import invoices, or, for series 2 and 3, dividends. These bonds can be sold in the secondary market, for a haircut which is usually about 30%. There has been talk of a new series specifically for old invoices.
  • Blue chip swaps: these involve using pesos to buy USD bonds, which can then be sold in dollars. The haircut on selling these varies: it has been as high as.....

Commentary

There are some things in life which are always a fixed time in the future: the big joke about nuclear fusion is that it is 30 years away – and it was 30 years away back in 1970. Similar comments have been made about Vietnam’s economic potential: despite being hailed by many as the next China for economic growth, with its population of nearly 100 million people, and high levels of education and entrepreneurship, it has remained one of the more difficult places to do business and manage cash.

• This call showed that the economy has made progress. Participants generally have businesses which are profitable and generating cash, and obtaining and remitting hard currency is not the major challenge it used to be. However, there is a lot of bureaucracy to be complied with, and it is not plain sailing.
• Cash repatriation and trapped cash are issues. The only truly viable way of extracting cash from the country is via dividends – this means cash accumulates until the financial year has been closed, audited, and tax paid.
• One participant has been involved in a situation where cash was repatriated via a prepayment of intercompany royalties – this required approval from the central bank.
• Intercompany loans out of the country are

Commentary

All international companies put a lot of effort into avoiding having cash trapped in emerging countries. But, despite our best efforts, there are still situations where cash accumulates in places from which it can’t be repatriated. This quickly becomes a lose/lose situation for the MNC: often the countries involved have high rates of inflation, and usually provide low rates of return on bank deposits – or even no return at all. So the cash loses its economic value, while counterparty risk quickly becomes an issue, over and above the sovereign risk concerns. Further, depending on the company’s accounting policies, exchange losses can negatively impact reported profits, as the local currency depreciates.

The purpose of this call was to discuss how to make the best of this bad situation – to look for ways of managing the issue.

• Generally, there was consensus that standard risk management approaches continue to apply. No-one is prepared to ignore their usual principles.
• However, there was consensus that some flexibility may be appropriate. The question is – how much?
• The first problem is bank deposits: all participants preferred to continue to use international banks, even if they often provide lower rates than local ones. The counterparty risk issues with local banks were not viewed as sufficient to offset any increased return.
• Most participants were in favour of putting pressure on the international banks to increase rates: in Latin America,  the European banks were generally viewed as being more responsive than their American counterparts, with Santander being used frequently: BBVA was